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Epigenetics is a burgeoning field of contemporary biosciences, which has attracted a lot of interest 
both in biomedical and in social sciences 
Sources of data 
Unsystematic literature analysis and retrospective mapping of highly cited work (source: Web of 
Science core collection) in the social sciences and humanities engaging with epigenetics 
Areas of agreement 
Epigenetics poses no new ethical issue over and above those discussed in relation to genetics 
Areas of controversy 
However, it encourages a different framing and reflexivity on some of the commonly held categories 
in the moral uptake of scientific discoveries.  
Growing points 
Epigenetics presents us with normative questions that touch upon privacy, responsibility for 
individual health and for the wellbeing of future generations, as well as matters of health justice and 
equality of opportunities. 
Areas timely for developing research 
Epigenetic thinking could help us adjust and refine the problem-frames and categories that inform 
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Introduction 
The science of epigenetics is a burgeoning field of contemporary biosciences, which has attracted a 
lot of attention both in biomedical and in social sciences. Stricto sensui, epigenetics finds its origins 
in Conrad Hal Waddington’s theory of epigenesis, pointing to the “need to remember that between 
genotype and phenotype, and connecting them to each other, there lies a whole complex of 
developmental processes” (p.10)4, which Waddington designated with the term ‘epigenotype’. 
Currently, epigenetics represents a heterogeneous and interdisciplinary field of biosciences5, which 
thoroughly inscribes itself in the technologically intensive style of knowledge-production of the 
present post-genomic age. First, the field of epigenetics encompasses some research endeavours that, 
after the completion of the Human Genome Project, are directed to the establishment of profiles and 
functional maps of our genome, by resorting to next-generation sequencing technologies. 
Epigenomics aims at producing complete cartographies of the specific chemical modifications of 
DNA (e.g. methylation), histones (e.g. histone methylation, acetylation, phosphorylation), chromatin 
(e.g. nucleosome positioning), and the RNA expression profiles that produce specific states of our 
genome when differentiating into the several cellular types of our bodies at different stages of 
development, and in pathological conditions6,7. Second, numerous studies have accumulated on the 
role of the epigenome as a biological interface for the embodiment of social conditions, biographical 
histories, and environmental exposures. In this respect, epigenetics represents a knowledge repertoire 
that promises to account for the ‘molecular conduit’8 that links one’s milieu and life conditions with 
one’s basic biological functioning. For this reason, epigenetic methods and techniques have 
productively engaged with long-standing epidemiological questions about the relationship between 
social status and health over the lifecourse, the role of developmental processes and infant’s early life 
in the programming of adult health, or even the effects of long-term exposures to chemicals in the 
aetiology of the most common diseases (see9 for an overview). Third, epigenetics includes also 
studies accounting for different temporal scales of those processes of embodiment and biological 
archival of one’s experiences. Several animal studies, and some human studies have produced 
evidence of multigenerational transmission of epigenetic marks acquired by the parental generation 
related to metabolic predispositions, as well as behavioural traits (e.g. stress coping, depression)10. 
These enticing and at times contested findings11 highlight the possibility of gamete-mediated 
transmission of traits epigenetically acquired during the lifetime across multiple generations, and 
                                               
i It should be noted that the research themes and issues currently at the centre of epigenetic sciences have a much longer 
history in that they go at the core of questions related to the plasticity of our bodies in ontogenesis, the permeability of 
biology to environmental and social conditions during the lifecourse, as well as the bearing of these processes in 
adaptation, inheritance and evolution; see 1,2,3. 
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postulate the importance of understanding individual predispositions as standing in continuity with 
the health, biographies, life conditions and actions of both previous and following generations. 
The present review aims at presenting an overview of the ethical, political and social aspects of 
epigenetics, drawing from an unsystematic literature analysis and retrospective mapping of highly 
cited work (source: Web of Science core collection) in the social sciences and humanities engaging 
with this domain of the life sciences. As we will see below, the theoretical and experimental 
perspectives animating epigenetics render this field a particularly prolific terrain of engagement for 
social sciences and the humanities, and raise challenges that go beyond the mere apportionment of 
normative exercises at the level of individual and/or collective agencies. Epigenetic knowledge does 
not only present us with ethical and political issues of utmost relevance, but rather seems to encourage 
a different framing and reflexivity on some of the commonly held categories in the moral uptake of 
scientific discoveries.  
 
Ethical normativity 
It is worth noting here how institutional configurations and analytic categories deployed for the 
societal uptake of epigenetics owe much to the advent of genetics, as well as to its scrutiny on the 
side of social sciences and humanities scholarship. The praxis of the ELSI program established within 
the Human Genome Project12 has in fact provided a model upon which to build several international 
consortia also in epigenetic science (e.g. The International Human Epigenome Consortium), which 
have endowed themselves with similar working groups on the ethical implications of their research. 
These bioethicists play a vital role both in establishing and mitigating the ethical issues internal to 
the proceedings of scientific practices (e.g. providing guidance to data and sample handling, 
establishing privacy protection standards specific to epigenetic research), and in contributing to the 
analysis of the potential ethical challenges emerging from epigenetic science.  
Chiefly, however, the close engagement of these scholars with the practical configurations of 
epigenetic science, modelled on the scholarly scrutiny of science established in genetic research, has 
produced the significant centrality of the question: is epigenetics confronting us with any exceptional 
issue that was not raised by genetics13? With regard to this point, a substantial agreement exists in the 
bioethical literature. Epigenetics, according to several scholars, poses no “new ethical issue over and 
above those discussed in relation to genetics” (p.469)14; however – as we will see in the remaining – 
it complicates the established framing and intensifies the cogency of several of them.  
Privacy and confidentiality 
The first issue is the one of privacy and confidentiality of health-related information. Epigenetics is 
in fact another instance of the broader problem of how to ensure an appropriate protection of sensitive 
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data from research participants and patients at a time in which vast networks of *omics research data 
and health records are being created worldwide. Yet, epigenetic data appear to intensify the ethical 
concerns attached to risks of privacy breaches and re-identification in two main respects. Primarily, 
due to the fact that methylation study techniques like Whole-Genome Bisulfite Sequencing (WGBS) 
could expose genetic information, and thus potentially lead to re-identification of sample donors. As 
shown by Dyke and colleagues15 public epigenomic databases report DNA methylation data that are 
indirectly affected by single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and consequently provide an 
information specific to individual participants that could potentially be used for re-identification 
through genetic matching. By making accessible epigenetic data, epigenomic databases thus run the 
risk to expose also genetic information which normally would not be made accessible. Although the 
removal of this direct genotype information does not ensure absolute privacy, these scholars have 
called for the development of policies specific to epigenetic data release in major international 
consortia that could reasonably minimise the risks of re-identification. Secondly, epigenetics raises 
privacy-related concerns for the possibility to impute personal data from methylation encompassing 
not only medical conditions (e.g. disease predispositions), but potentially also lifestyle behaviours. 
Although Yann Joly and colleagues rightly warn us that we should not inflate the (limited) combined 
risks of re-identification and privacy breaches from epigenetic data16, validated studies have so far 
showed that sensitive information such as alcohol and tobacco consumption information can be 
accurately inferred from methylation arrays17. It is thus possible to speculate that, as evidence of 
epigenetic signatures for substance-consumption, experiences and lifestyle behaviours increases, the 
risks of privacy breaches conditional to re-identification of donors from epigenetic data are also likely 
to intensify, and could lead to secondary uses of epigenetic information in various settings such as 
insurance (e.g. distinguishing never, former or current smokers) and employment (e.g. establishing 
an employee’s susceptibility to disease)13. This possibility has led also to the call for legislative 
updates of current regulations preventing genetic discrimination, as a substantive disagreement exists 
concerning their applicability to epigenetic data18. Finally, speculations19 about a potentially positive 
role of these epigenetic markers of lifestyles and individual experiences can also be found with regard 
to their potential use  for forensic purposes. These epigenetic bio-social archives could in fact allow, 
according to this stream of work, the inference of both behavioural information (e.g. alcohol and 
tobacco consumption) and bodily features (e.g. biological age) of the person to which the samples 
recovered on a crime scene belong. 
Epigenetic responsibility for health  
The capacity of epigenetic signatures to account biologically for how individual behaviours and 
lifestyles affect the phenotype later in life (and potentially across generations) leads us to the second 
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ethical controversy substantively revamped by epigenetics: individual responsibility for health. 
Several scholars have in fact already warned us against the possibility that epigenetic knowledge may 
be presented as making visible, at the molecular level, the consequences of individual unhealthy 
behaviours20,21. Precisely by making knowledgeable the effects of our habits on our health, these 
authors argue, epigenetics may become an enabling platform to anchor normative options of ‘what 
ought to be’ done with regard to one’s health down to the level of the ‘integrity’ of our epigenome. 
Epigenetics is attributed the potential to go beyond correlative epidemiological data about risky 
behaviours and their consequence for health, and thus could constitute knowledge of the molecular 
chain of events that starts from a certain lifestyle and/or environmental factor and causally leads to 
disease development. Being framed as accountability for damaging, or as prospective responsibility 
to improve one’s own epigenome, several authors agree that the molecular quantification of the 
effects of lifestyles on our health could problematically “make a change in degree” (p.178)21 in moral 
claims of individual versus collective responsibilities for health, or at least constitute an evidence-
base for compelling individuals “to do something” (p.464)14 for protecting it. Furthermore, this 
feature of epigenetics may also constitute the epistemic correlate and evidentiary legitimisation of the 
well-established policy emphasis on responsibility for health, often resorting to rhetorics of 
empowerment and self-determination with regard to health22.  
The reasons to be wary of claims to epigenetic responsibility for health rest primarily on empirical 
grounds; namely, the epistemic and actionable value of the correlations between epigenetic markers 
and lifestyles. As shown by prominent epigenetic epidemiologists Bastiaan Heijmans and Jonathan 
Mill23,24, the characterization of the effects of individual habits – but also exposures, life conditions, 
psychosocial factors – on the epigenome is limited in several respects. First, the correlations between 
epigenetic marks and environmental stimuli have yet to prove their biological implications in terms 
of gene expression, function, and consequently their causal role in pathogenesis. It is in fact far from 
being established whether changes in (for instance) DNA methylation translate into differences in 
gene expression in a disease-relevant manner, whether these changes are individually responsible for 
the phenotypes observed, or whether they may affect gene transcription only in functional networks 
(when they co-occur with other changes to gene expression, due for instance to other independent 
modifications of the methylome). Second, epigenetic variation is not due solely to environmental 
stimuli such as lifestyle behaviours. As it is known, epigenetic marks are malleable and reversible 
and respond to several other factors in the external milieu, as well as those in the internal cellular 
environment due to (for instance) individual genetic differences. Adjudicating whether an effect is 
due to lifestyles, other environmental stimuli, or genetic differences – or indeed a combination of the 
three – is thus a complex puzzle that is currently impossible to solve, on the basis of the available 
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technologies and knowledge. Besides this, it should also be noted the role of stochastic processes in 
the epigenetic patterning of gene expression in different cell types.  
The observation that both deterministic and stochastic factors can shape epigenomic variation 
suggests therefore that epigenetic studies may be unable to disentangle respectively the causal role of 
individual lifestyle-related, genetic and environmental factors in the aetiology of disease, and 
consequently constitutes a strong empirical reason to normatively dismiss the claims to epigenetic 
responsibility introduced above. As argued by Hedlund21, these empirical observations against causal 
individual responsibility for the aberrant effects of epigenetic variations shift the normative burden 
of prevention to collective agencies (e.g. the State, public health agencies). Since individual factors 
act in concert with social, economic, political structural conditions – and, it should be added, also 
other material determinants such as genetic variation – responsibilities for epigenetic predispositions 
to diseases should not be handled individually. The causality behind lifestyle-related diseases, she 
argues, is an intricate web of social, economic and political factors of which no individual could be 
ascribed full responsibility.  
Other scholars have called instead for a more nuanced approach to epigenetic responsibility, which 
would not limit itself to alternatively locate it at the level of individual or collective agencies. Dupras 
and Ravitsky25, for instance, dismiss individual responsibility claims in light of the complex spectrum 
of plasticity, variability and indeterminacy characterising our epigenome. If the epigenome changes 
over temporalities of development, over individual genetic differences, and stochasticity – they argue 
– what healthy behaviours should individuals strive for to avoid aberrant epigenetic modifications in 
a morally relevant sense? Yet, the authors also disagree with Hedlund in that they consider assigning 
responsibility only to States and collectives to be simplistic. According to them, denying that some 
consequences of aberrant epigenetic effects may fall under the scope of individual agency – provided 
that certain conditions of capacity to act are met, and that action takes place in a time window of 
susceptibility for a specific and known epigenetic effect – means misrepresenting the complex nature 
and opportunities offered by epigenetics. For this reason, Dupras and Ravitsky call for a normative 
uptake of epigenetic responsibility that is attentive to scientific detail and limitations and that 
establishes the (material and moral) conditions as well as opportunities to act effectively in order to 
protect one’s epigenome.  
Furthermore, several Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars have rather focused on the 
socio-political conditions behind the production and recruitment of epigenetic knowledge in support 
of normative claims of individual responsibility for health. While Ruth Müller and her colleagues26,27 
have highlighted from an interdisciplinary perspective how the language and metaphors of 
reductionism and determinism (e.g. an alleged epigenetic mark for poverty) in biological sciences are 
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one reason for such simplistic normative translations of epigenetics, other authors have instead 
focused on the co-production of epigenetic knowledge of lifestyle-related effects and current social 
discourses, policy frameworks and political cultures of individualization in healthcare. Epigenetics is 
– to this latter view – not just contributing evidence in support of responsibility-sensitive policies for 
future healthcare. Rather, the kinds of questions and answers animating this field of research are one 
result of the socio-political emphasis put on the devolution of power and responsibility for health to 
individuals22. This shared recognition calls for further empirical investigations into the hidden 
assumptions and premises of knowledge-production in epigenetics, which could highlight the 
narratives, metaphors and moralizing frameworks informing research into the molecular effects of 
lifestyles and behaviours.  
Parental and procreative epigenetic responsibility 
Evidence of multigenerational epigenetic effects purport that parental biological influences extend 
past the moment of conception, thus assigning a pivotal role to pre-conception pathways of 
inheritance of biological predispositions. From effects of parental (and also grandparental) exposures, 
to in utero signalling and transduction of environmental influences, the picture drawn by this stream 
of epigenetic research suggests extending arguments in favour of the ‘responsibility for protecting 
one’s epigenome’ to the context of reproduction.  
Needless to say, responsibilities of prospective parents in reproductive practices are no novelty 
brought about by epigenetics. Boosted by the advent of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), 
and various prenatal genetic diagnostic or screening techniques, sociological and philosophical 
scholarship has widely emphasized the creation of new normative and societal domains in 
reproduction. Some authors have focused on the ethical and political issues raised by the possibility 
to select and intervene upon the child’s genetic make-up28. Other scholars have instead focused on 
the mutual shaping of reproductive technologies and the social order of procreative practices, by 
highlighting the generation of a ‘biomedical mode of reproduction’29. Within this context, the 
discourse emerging from multigenerational epigenetics may – once again – reframe normative issues 
related to the responsibilities we hold to promote the health of future generations. In particular, 
epigenetic knowledge of how lifestyles and environmental hazards are likely to yield adverse health 
outcomes in the offspring and in subsequent generations intervenes upon these matters in three main 
respects. First, the legacy of epigenetic marks may expand the temporal boundaries of already 
disputed parental obligations to ‘procreative beneficence’; i.e. the idea that we might have a moral 
obligation (where a choice can be made) to bring to birth the “best” child possible, or at least to 
minimize her potential suffering30. By shedding a light on the potential harmful consequences of 
individual unhealthy lifestyles (from birth to reproduction) on future generations, epigenetics may 
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extend these controversial normative claims far beyond the moment of reproduction, thus compelling 
individuals to mitigate the risks and threats to the wellbeing of those we (will) care for over the whole 
life-course. From recasting young adults as responsible prospective parents (even in the absence of 
any imminent project of parenthood), to instating liability of actual parents for past imprudent 
behaviours, these epigenetic data fold different temporalities31 into moral claims to procreative 
beneficence. Acting responsibly towards the health of future generations would include, if we take at 
face value studies of epigenetic inheritance, predispositions acquired by prospective parents 
throughout their whole life-course, and would extend also to those they have inherited from their own 
parental lineages. Second, this focus on pre-conception pathways of transmission of disease 
predispositions touches upon the distribution among the prospective parents of normative claims 
related to lifestyle-related epigenetic programming of health and disease. Although several social 
scientists have compellingly shown a systematic moral emphasis on effects transduced by the mother 
during pregnancy32,33, evidence of epigenetic transmission through the male germline adds the 
normative relevance of non-genetic predispositions inherited from the paternal line to claims of 
responsibility for health in light of future generations. The growing evidence of paternal effects is in 
fact vocalised within the community of scientists – but perhaps then not much put to action – as 
encouraging researchers to think about the developmental contribution of both parents equally, or at 
least to acknowledge the differential contribution of maternal and paternal epigenetic predispositions, 
along with the gestational period, when looking at the epigenetic origins of adult diseases. Third, 
evidence of epigenetic multigenerational effects constitutes a moral imaginary of responsibility to 
protect the wellbeing of future generations that, in contrast to genomics, appears to fall within 
everyone’s means21. Knowledge of epigenetic inheritance does not require in fact its crystallization 
in the form of a technology (e.g. prenatal testing, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis) to demand 
actionability mainly because it enlarges the scope of responsibility for the health of (future) offspring 
to cover the requirement to adopt a healthy lifestyle for both prospective mothers and fathers. This 
element has led some scholars to highlight the risk that the prospect of these studies may be translated 
into prescriptive messages for parents-to-be well before reaching its time as established and validated 
medical knowledge34. 
Obviously, we will not reiterate here how the above-mentioned arguments against claims to 
epigenetic responsibility tout court apply also in the case of studies focusing on the multigenerational 
transmission of epigenetic predispositions to disease. Claims to epigenetic parental responsibility are 
in fact problematic for the same reasons encountered above. On the one hand, they diverge the 
attention from the complex causality of disease development and the corresponding collective 
responsibilities to mitigate detrimental structural effects of social arrangements and determinants of 
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health on periconceptual, prenatal, childhood and adolescent development. On the other hand, it 
should also be noted how studies of epigenetic multigenerational effects are often recruited as a 
“solid” epistemological and technological ground to confirm existing social emphasis and prejudices, 
and in particular those upon the body of the mother as a locus of political government of health, and 
prevention of future diseases32,33. Yet, also other counter-arguments that are specific to the 
intergenerational nature of these effects apply to claims in favour of parental and procreative 
epigenetic responsibility. 
The first of such lines of criticism argues that procreative epigenetic risk messaging could pave the 
way to what Juengst and colleagues34 have termed ‘epi-eugenics’; that is, an undueii social pressure 
on prospective parents to limit preconception and prenatal risky exposures, or to undergo testing for 
epigenetic alterations in the gametes and/or developing foetus. Very much like in the case of genetic 
technologies – which have been deemed problematic for their encouragement of practices of selection 
and optimization in reproduction – one reason for thinking of claims to parental and procreative 
epigenetic responsibility in negative moral terms stems from the condemnation attached in common 
sense morality to the eugenic imperative of tinkering with and improving the human biological pool. 
With the addition, however, that – as shown above – the complexity of the epigenome calls into the 
question the capacity of individual actions to fulfil this imperative in the face of larger social 
configurations having an effect on epigenetic predispositions, and thus runs the risk of making 
prospective parents responsible for what should be collective public health concerns.  
This leads us to a second argument against parental and procreative epigenetic responsibility, which 
points to the societal reverberations of the injunction towards the protection and optimization of 
epigenetic predispositions for the benefit of future generations. According to this view, what is wrong 
with these practices is that they send out a message about existing people: either people (and their 
parents) with specific conditions due to an epigenetic mark, or all those who (for instance) share a 
specific life history or socioeconomic status. Nourishing expectations for prospective parents to 
prevent these effects might unfairly target the most vulnerable groups in our societies, and create the 
condition for social blame of those already suffering from injustices. As summarized by Juengst and 
colleagues34, promoting parental and procreative epigenetic responsibility for migrants exposed to 
                                               
iiI will not delve here into definitional issues of ‘eugenics’, which also impact its evaluation in moral terms. It is in fact 
far from obvious that any practice falling under a descriptive definition of ‘eugenics’ such as ‘improving the human 
biological pool’ can be deemed morally problematic. Yet, it suffices to say for the purpose of the present analysis that the 
use of the term by Juengst and colleagues is clearly connoted with condemnation, although the criteria for holding such 
practices problematic are not specified in their work. For a socio-historical analysis of both reactionary and progressive 
political stances in the eugenic movement, see chapter 3 in3. For an analysis of the moral reasons and arguments to hold 
eugenic practices morally problematic, see chapter  6 in28. 
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pesticides, or those living around food deserts, or those exposed to personal and collective tragedies 
“merely adds insult to moral injury” (p.428). 
Third, one of the main critiques of future-oriented responsibilities to protect one’s epigenome is the 
famous objection known as the non-identity problem. This long-standing philosophical issue, which 
is particularly cogent in relation to transgenerational epigenetics35,36, starts from the recognition that 
actions undertaken for protecting future generations will impinge on the number and identity of 
people that will be brought to existence. This means that both acting and not acting to do so cannot 
be said to benefit or harm anyone simply because these two lines of action engender two different 
sets of people, who both owe their existence precisely to the choice in question. Thus, especially in 
the case of epigenetic effects transmitted through the gametes – i.e., effects that do not affect a given 
existing individual, such as those transmitted from grandparents to grandchildren – claims in favour 
of procreative and parental epigenetic responsibility appear to fall into a philosophical paradox. 
Whose benefit would be promoted by acting responsibly to protect one’s epigenome for the sake of 
future generations’ wellbeing? Unless we are facing an actual individual, such as in the case of 
gestational epigenetic effects37 – which are however problematic for their targeting of maternal bodies 
– the objection from the non-identity problem suggests that a failure to fulfil such responsibility 
cannot harm future generations. Furthermore, this issue finds an additional complication when we 
take into account that epigenetic predispositions assume a positive or negative health-related value 
only when certain environmental conditions are met. In other words, some epigenetic marks (e.g. 
metabolic predispositions) may turn out to be potentialities that get realized as pathological (e.g. 
cardiovascular disease) only in the mismatch with a given social context (e.g. food availability and 
composition)38. How to establish then the right actions to undertake in the present when the living 
conditions of future generations may be different? 
 
Political normativity 
So far, we have encountered critiques to the normative exercises stemming from epigenetic 
knowledge that argued for the need of addressing these issues at a collective and political level. The 
complexity of epigenomic programming of health points in fact to the combined contribution of 
individual agency and structural social conditions in these processes, and thus suggests the need to 
adopt a public health and/or populational perspective to justify the moral cogency of interventions 
based on epigenetic knowledge. In this section, I will explore in more details how epigenetics relates 
to political arguments touching upon notions of health equity and equality of opportunities; once 
again, as we will see, epigenetics does not present us with new issues, but rather seems to intervene 
upon the framing and the established categories employed to address questions of social and 
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distributive justice in healthcare. Instead of focusing, then, on the potential evaluation of epigenetics 
from the standpoints of distinct theories of justice in healthcare (cf.39,40), here I will focus on whether 
epigenetics substantively reconfigures the moral exercises required by these approaches to justice in 
health. 
The shift from risk groups to individuals at risk 
One of the controversies around epigenetics in health justice matters has to do with a shift in 
perspective when evaluating the unequal distribution of harmful exposures in our societies. 
Substances that cause aberrant epigenetic effects – such as pesticides, pollutants, toxic chemicals, bad 
nutrients, tobacco – are in fact not distributed equally in the general population. Being exposed to 
such substances is often associated with socioeconomic position, or with broader societal 
configurations (e.g. occupational exposures, living conditions, food deserts), which have already been 
shown to frequently burden the worst-off in our societies more than the average population. As 
emphasized by the long-standing epidemiological literature on the social determinants of health41, 
promoting social mobility and reducing these broader inequalities might in fact have an aggregate 
impact on health greater than an approach at level of individual care. So, the question arises: is 
epigenetics simply reiterating the same normative claims to correct these inequalities (but on different 
epistemic grounds), or is this knowledge heightening moral obligations to remediate these risks?  
In answering this question, different authors appear to take (at least) two distinct positions. On the 
one hand, Rothstein and colleagues42, and Huang and King43 point out that epigenetics does not add 
anything sufficiently unique to the question of health inequalities, as a matter of ethics, policy and 
regulations. Harms due to the skewed distribution of exposures, societal configurations, and their 
multigenerational effects are no novelty in the biomedical literature, and may also be caused by 
biological mechanisms other than epigenetics. Genetic somatic mutations, Rothstein and colleagues 
argue, are also following a similar distributive pattern in our societies, and yet they have not produced 
any significant impetus to correct environmental injustices. Thus, Rothstein and colleagues ask, “is 
it logical or politically expedient to focus on the biological basis of the harm?” (p.7). Furthermore, 
these authors also find reasons not to invest epigenetic mechanisms with such an expectation. In a 
society characterised by indifference to “the plight of the less fortunate”, and by a reductionist 
emphasis on the internal causes of disease, there is a risk that the societal response to epigenetic harms 
will privilege “clinical rather than environmental interventions to treat those afflicted”, thus brushing 
over the structural “social and economic causes of hazardous exposures” (p.8). On similar grounds 
stands the critique of Huang and King43. These authors add to arguments against the exceptionality 
of epigenetics for social justice also a fine-grained critique of the inexpedient nature of epigenetic 
marks to support policies for the improvement of environmental conditions. As shown by the 
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literature supporting the ‘mismatch hypothesis’38, they argue, epigenetic predispositions to health 
disadvantages depend very much on the context: some patterns of epigenetic programming are 
maladaptive, or represent alternatively an improvement of individual fitness only conditionally to a 
given environment. Thus, the formulation of universal policies against a specific epigenetic mark may 
be impossible, if not worth avoiding on moral grounds, in order not to prevent the benefits of certain 
predispositions to arise under the local conditions that render them so.  
On the other hand, different authors40,44 emphasize how epigenetics could concretely measure the 
magnitude of biological insults due to environmental exposures, and consequently quantify the harm 
caused by health inequalities resulting from social arrangements in a given individual. The specificity 
of epigenetics thus amounts to its possibility to deliver “health monitoring markers” (p.147)40 that 
could identify the aberrant impact of social background on health on the basis of considerations of 
time (e.g. sensitive windows), context (e.g. concurring environmental conditions) and biological 
background (e.g. individual genomic variance). Starting from this recognition and from a luck-
egalitarian perspective40 (i.e. the idea that we have a duty to compensate inequalities that are due to 
social and biological factors beyond one’s control), it could be argued that the possibilities offered 
by epigenetics for health justice consist in a finer prioritization of resources correcting inequalities 
beyond individual control. Primarily, because epigenetics would offer a tangible measure of the 
increased risk to which some disadvantaged individuals are exposed, simply due to bad luck (e.g. 
social position, upbringing, living conditions). Epigenetics might therefore at least aid to quantify the 
impact of long-term accumulation of environmental insults on people from disadvantaged social 
background. Secondly, because stratification of individual risk on an epigenetic basis would even 
allow equalizing the health outcomes in the known risk groups, as it could enable the development of 
prevention strategies directed to those – more unlucky among the unlucky, it could be said – who are 
more likely to develop a disease based on a combination of physiological and environmental factors. 
In other words, knowledge of epigenetic mechanisms may not only confirm the moral necessity – for 
those who hold it – to intervene upon the skewed distribution of environmental hazards and health 
risks in certain groups of our societies, but could potentially shift questions of justice from “should 
we correct the unequal distribution of exposures in a society”, to “who are those individuals harmed 
by such unequal conditions”?  
Blurring the boundary between natural endowments and social inequalities 
A second controversy concerning the impact of epigenetics on justice-based evaluations of health-
related inequalities deals with qualification of epigenetic predispositions – especially those acting 
upon multigenerational temporalities –  as natural endowments, or as effects of social position acting 
via a biological mechanism. In fact, understanding epigenome-based health disadvantages as one or 
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the other has also an impact over their evaluation as unjust social inequalities. As shown by different 
authors39,40,44, the categories pertinent to distinct theories of justice may provide a limited framework 
from which to construct an evaluation of the complexity of epigenetic processes in terms of health 
equity. To illustrate this point, let us refer to one example of this difficulty highlighted by Loi and 
colleagues40 in relation to Rawlsian egalitarianism. In Rawlsian terms, there is an obligation to 
remedy to unequal opportunities if these are not due to natural endowments, i.e. biological 
predispositions and talents possessed at birth that are distributed through a “natural lottery”. Also 
known as the Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) principle, this bit of Rawls’ theory of justice 
demands that no social or legal barrier shall be put over the possibilities to improve one’s social 
position, and that people who are endowed with the same talents and motivations should have equal 
chances of achieving these positions. In a nutshell, Rawlsian egalitarianism places the predispositions 
we are born with outside the scope of justice. How then to evaluate epigenetic disadvantages on the 
basis of the FEO principle? Loi and colleagues40 provide a mixed answer to this question. One line 
of reasoning could indeed point out that the epigenetic predispositions people are born with are just 
another example of the natural “(epi)genetic lottery” (p.149)40 whose correction does not concern the 
Rawlsian egalitarian. If indeed we define these epigenetic marks as natural endowments possessed at 
birth, then promoting the FEO principle does not demand to correct them, regardless of whether they 
result from social inequalities. A different line of reasoning could instead point out how epigenetic 
marks are nothing more than a social inequality acting through a biological mechanism, and thus 
conclude that they require the application of the FEO principle. Indeed, epigenetic risks and 
predispositions are sensitive to the starting social position of an individual in the case of gestational 
effects, or even the result of the adverse and disadvantaged social conditions experienced by parents 
and grandparents in cases of multigenerational epigenetic inheritance.  
Without the need to solve this philosophical and normative quandary (cf.45), it is worth underlining – 
once again – how the example of Rawlsian egalitarianism offers an illustration of the challenges 
raised by epigenetics to the established categories for the normative assessment of health inequalities. 
More than requiring the application of theories of justice for the resolution of its societal issues, 
epigenetics seems to question commonly held views about what counts as natural and/or socio-
political (inequality) and blurs the distinction between disadvantages due to natural endowments and 
those due to social, economic and political structures. In other words, epigenetics provides a clear-
cut example of how the biology of individuals is partly a social factiii: how does this affect the 
questions we can ask about the good of our societies? 
                                               
iii It is worth underlining here, as argued by Huang and King43, that patterns of social determination of natural endowments 
are in no way an exceptional specificity of epigenetics. Without the need to emphasize how alternative biological 
pathways of embodiment of social conditions currently populate the landscape of post-genomic biosciences46 (e.g. 
Epigenetics: ethics, politics, biosociality – L.Chiapperino 
 15 
 
Conclusions: epigenetics, biosociality, moral thickness 
At the core of the epigenetic endeavour lies the attempt to account for the social, political, economic 
and culturally-situated unfolding of our biology. This movement from the life sciences towards a 
social view of biological facts offers a seemingly promising avenue to rethink the aetiology of 
common diseases, their distribution in our societies, as well as the role of individual/collective 
agencies across multiple temporal frames, life contexts, and socio-political configurations. In a 
nutshell, epigenetics offers the opportunity to conceptualize what Meloni and colleagues46 explore as 
the biosociality of human life; namely, “the fundamental continuity of biological and social forces, 
organism and environment, agent and milieu” (p.5). 
In this review, I have briefly summarized how these biosocial openings in epigenetics interrogate us 
not just in terms of normative options, but also in terms of moral thinking. Epigenetics presents us 
with normative questions that touch upon privacy, responsibility for individual health and for the 
wellbeing of future generations, as well as matters of health justice and equality of opportunities. Yet, 
before deploying any evaluative outlook on these matters, the ideas, concepts and evidence animating 
the field of epigenetics also demand an engagement with present and past conditions of individuals 
(and their ancestors), or the estimate of people’s material and social opportunities to prevent and/or 
correct their aberrant predispositions, or a description of the socio-political and cultural realities they 
embody through epigenetic mechanisms. In doing so, epigenetics encourages therefore thickening 
moral exercises of privacy, responsibility, justice, and equity with a complex biosocial description of 
situations, of persons or actions, in order to afford their significantly balanced evaluation. The way 
these moral notions can be used in the case of epigenetics is, in other words, determined by 
temporalities, types and scales of embodiment of the social world, which urge us in turn to adjust and 
refine, in a situated manner, the problem-frames and categories that inform our ethical and political 
questions as well as judgements.  
 
  
                                               
microbiomics, metabolomics), the authors rightly underline how “any form of selection of traits due to parental advantage, 
[…], would serve to undermine the concept of randomly distributed ‘natural endowments” (p.77; original emphasis). In 
this respect, epigenetics may thus be regarded as no more than a cogent example of these broader dynamics, and one that 
may produce some biological signatures of embodied social disadvantages. 
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